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PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

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EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b) 50x5 / 8

DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEC 2038
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED w/CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

31 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway]; from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned.

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. <u>CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964</u>. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting.

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EXEMPTION: 6(1)(C)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

MAR 2016 6(1)(C)

COMMENT: [A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT.] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

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OCOFSA 7 2 1 / 6 3

purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

6(1)(c)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

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REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

MAR 2016

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT.

6(1)(C)

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacnrymating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo.

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

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Enclosure

circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another.

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities".

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures, including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane.

MAR 2016

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

6(1)(c)

MAR 2016

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to US governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the

6(1)(c)

interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

31 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

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2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C)

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[redacted]

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BY JOINT STAFF
EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

For Wheeler, C/S

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

9/23/3100 (8 JAN 63) w/JCS 2304/204-1

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

6(1)(c)

COMMENT: [redacted] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

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COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to

the area may take immediate protective measures [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters.

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. [redacted]

6(1)(C)

[redacted]

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

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REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

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"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT [redacted] Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

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circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

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"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

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6(1)(c)

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"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

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6(1)(c)

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT [redacted]

6(1)(c)

[redacted]

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

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2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.